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ARTICLE 9-NOTICE PROVISIONS UPON DEFAULT
INTRODUCTION
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code unified the law of se-
cured transactions. It treats various financing devices, such as the
chattel mortgage, the conditional sale, and the pledge as merely differ-
ent methods of creating security interests. Part 5 of article 9 sets out
the rights and remedies of the parties when a secured transaction breaks
down. Specifically, sections 9-504 and 9-505 impose notice require-
ments upon the secured party' before he may seek remedies for the
debtor's" default. These requirements were fashioned for simplicity
and flexibility,3 embodying the most practical of commercial needs-
salvaging as much of the benefits of the original transaction for the
secured party as possible, yet protecting the equity of the debtor in the
collateral.4 Despite the laudable efforts of the drafters, no other sec-
tions of the Code, save those dealing with warranties in the sale of
goods, have given rise to so much litigation. In view of the approval
of revisions in the 1972 Official Text5 and a recent Supreme Court de-
cision, Fuentes v. Shevin,6 it is appropriate to review the response of
courts to the problems encountered in the notice provisions of article 9.
DEFAULT AND REMEDIES IN GENERAL
Upon default the remedies of part 5 of article 9 become applicable.
The Code, however, does not define default;7 its meaning is left to the
1. UCC § 9-105(l)(i):
"Secured party" means a lender, seller or other person in whose favor there
is a security interest, including a person to whom accounts, contract rights
or chattel paper have been sold ....
2. UCC§ 9-105(I)(d):
"Debtor" means the person who owes payment or other performance of the
obligation secured, whether or not he owns or has rights in the collateral,
and includes the seller of accounts, contract rights or chattel paper ....
3. Hogan, The Secured Party and Default Proceedings Under the UCC, 47 MINN.
L. REv. 205, 220 (1962) [hereinafter cited as HOGAN].
4. UCC § 9-105(1)(c):
"Collateral" means the property subject to a security interest, and includes
accounts, contract rights and chattel paper which have been sold.
5. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 1972 OFFICIAL TEXT AND CoMMENTS OF ARTICLE
9, SECURED TRANSACTIONS, at viii (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 OFFICIAL TEXT].
The 1972 Text was approved by the ALI and the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws. 1972 OFFICIAL TEXT at viii.
6. Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972).
7. Borochoff Properties v. Howard Lumber Co., 115 Ga. App. 691, 696, 155
S.E.2d 651, 654 (1967).
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determination of the parties in the security agreement.8 Typically, par-
ties will provide that default occurs when a payment is missed, when
the collateral is transferred or removed without authorization, when a
petition in bankruptcy is filed or when the debtor dies.
Once default has occurred, the secured party can choose from three
basic remedies: section 9-504(3) allows the secured party to dispose
of the collateral by public or private sale or by any other disposition
which is commercially reasonable;9 section 9-505(2) permits the se-
cured party to propose a retention of the collateral in satisfaction of the
debt;1" and section 9-501(1) allows the secured party to "reduce his
claim to judgment or otherwise enforce the security interest by any
available judicial procedure."" His choice, however, is not a binding
election since the Code states that the rights and remedies upon de-
fault are cumulative.' 2
S. UCC § 9-105(1)(h): "'Security agreement' means an agreement which cre-
ates or provides for a security interest."
9. UCC § 9-504(3) (emphasis added):
Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings and
may be made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or other disposition
may be as a unit or in parcels and at any time and place and on any terms
but every aspect of the disposition including the method, manner, time, place
and terms must be commercially reasonable. Unless collateral is perishable
or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a
recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place of any public
sale or reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale or
other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to
the debtor, and except in the case of consumer goods to any other person who
has a security interest in the collateral and who has duly filed a financing
statement indexed in the name of the debtor in this state or who is known
by the secured party to have a security interest in the collateral. The secured
party may buy at any public sale and if the collateral is of a type customarily
sold in a recognized market or is of a type which is the subject of widely dis-
tributed standard price quotations he may buy at private sale.
10. UCC § 9-505(2) (emphasis added): "In any other case involving consumer
goods or any other collateral a secured party in possession may, after default, propose
to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation."
11. UCC§ 9-501(1):
When a debtor is in default under a security agreement, a secured party has
the rights and remedies provided in the security agreement. He may reduce
his claim to judgment, foreclosure or otherwise enforce the security interest
by any available judicial procedure. If the collateral is documents the se-
cured party may proceed either as to the documents or as to the goods cov-
ered thereby. A secured party in possession has the rights, remedies and
duties provided in 9-207. The rights and remedies referred to in this sub-
section are cumulative.
12. UCO § 9-501(1). Professor Gilmore has labelled the Code's multiplicity of
remedies as the "anything goes approach" to default. The breadth of the remedies,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1972/iss3/7
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THE IMPACT OF Fuentes v. Shevin
When the secured party does not reduce his claim to judgment by
judicial process but rather disposes of the collateral by sale or pro-
poses to retain it in satisfaction of the debt, he is exercising a self-help
remedy. The recent Supreme Court opinion in Fuentes casts doubt
upon the constitutionality of the Code's self-help remedies. In Fuen-
tes, a four-to-three decision, the majority held the Pennsylvania1 3 and
Florida 14 prejudgment replevin statutes unconstitutional.' 5 When the
debtors in Fuentes defaulted, the secured parties sought to regain pos-
session of the collateral through prejudgment writs of replevin which
authorized state officers to seize the property listed on the writs. The
Court noted that the repossession of the collateral by the secured par-
ties, under the authority of the state, was a deprivation of a possessory
interest within the protection of the fourteenth amendment. 16
The significance of Fuentes for the Code's self-help remedies lies in
the Court's recognition that the debtors' possession of household goods,
on which several payments were still due, was a property interest to
which the rationale of Sniadach v. Family Finance Coarp.17 and Gold-
berg v. Kelly'" extended. Sniadach and Goldberg require that before
the minimal red tape surrounding their execution, and the flexibility which character-
izes all the default provisions were specifically intended by the draftsmen to allow
the secured party, acting in good faith and utilizing his commercial expertise, to
realize the highest possible price from the collateral. See 2 G. GiMoRE, SEcuRiTY
INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY (1965) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE].
Professor Shuchman suggests that upon default there are usually two sales: one
where the dealer sells to another dealer at a wholesale price and then the other where
the purchasing dealer sells the automobile at retail price. He notes that the first sale
in the wholesale market is usually thirty to fifty percent below the going wholesale
price while the second sale in the retail market is usually able to bring full value. He
writes, "In nearly half the cases examined, the difference between the actual first
resale in the wholesale market and an equally first resale in the retail market would
have meant the difference between a deficiency judgment and full satisfaction of the
debt." Shuchman, Profit on Default: Archival Study of Automobile Repossession and
Resale, 22 STAN. L. REv. 20, 31-32 (1969).
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1821 (1967).
14. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.01-.13 (1964).
15. Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 2002 (1972).
16. Id.
17. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). The case held that
even a temporary deprivation of wages through prejudgment garnishment worked a dep-
rivation of property within the protection of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
18. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Following Sniadach, the Court held
that welfare benefits could not be cut off without a hearing.
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there can be any taking of property under color of state law, there
must be notice and an opportunity to be heard.
The self-help remedies of the Code, however, provide that the se-
cured party can repossess the collateral pursuant to section 9-503 and
dispose of it by sale or otherwise under section 9-504(3) notwith-
standing that the debtor may not have received notice or has not had
the opportunity to be heard by an impartial tribunal. Under the Fuen-
tes rationale, the self-help remedies would be constitutionally void if
the Court were to find that the secured party was acting under the
color of state law.19
In Adams v. Egley,20 a California district court has recently held
that the California legislature's enactment of sections 9-503 and 9-504
constituted sufficient state action to hold these sections invalid under
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 21 The Egley
court reasoned that the enactment of these sections persuaded or induced
secured parties to include the self-help remedies in their security
agreements. 2 The court rather forcefully rejected the argument that
the self-help remedies did not involve state action because they were
self-executing contract provisions between private citizens.13
The dissenting Justices in Fuentes considered the majority decision
to be an "ideological tinkering with state law" which would have little
impact.24 They chided the majority for failing to consider properly
19. In Fuentes, it was clear that the secured party had invoked the authority of
the state. The writs were orders to state officers to take possession of the listed prop-
erty. Whether today's Court would be willing to extend the state action theory fol-
lowed in the racial discrimination cases, e.g. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967),
to situations involving secured transactions is an open question. In Reitman, the
Court found that a clause of the California Constitution was enacted as a repealer
of California's anti-discriminatory housing legislation and that it actually functioned
as state encouragement to private discrimination. Thus, state action for purposes of
the fourteenth amendment was found in the state's enactment of the clause.
20. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
21. Id. at 617. The Adams court relied on Reitman. See note 19 supra.
22. The Adams court at 617 states,
The specific reference to the Uniform Commercial Code in the Adams con-
tract and to "immediate repossession . . . according to law" in the Posadas
contract are ample indication that in drawing up the agreements defendant
creditors were "persuaded or induced to include" repossession by the fact that
such repossession was permitted by statute.
According to the Adams court, such inducement or persuasion is sufficient "state ac-
tion" for purposes of the fourteenth amendment.
23. Id. at 620. Cf. McCormack v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.
Fla. 1971).
24. Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 2006 (1972).
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the interest of the secured party in protecting the collateral and for ne-
glecting to give proper weight to recent studies of the Permanent Edi-
torial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code, which suggested only
minor changes to the Code's self-help provisions.25
At this juncture, it is presumptuous to conclude that Fuentes nec-
essarily implies that the Code's self-help remedies are unconstitu-
tional. Several points cast doubt upon any extension of the case.
The Fuentes majority was narrow and Justices Powell and Rehnquist,
known for their attitude of judicial restraint, did not participate. More-
over, the majority opinion's analysis of the special nature and interests
involved in secured transactions is inadequate; it fails to recognize that
the right to look to the collateral upon default was the very basis upon
which the secured party entered into the transaction.26  Furthermore,
the Fuentes case clearly involved state action, yet it is still open to ques-
tion, notwithstanding Egley, whether the Code's self-help remedies nec-
essarily involve state action within the meaning of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Finally, it is difficult to predict the reaction of the court when
forced to determine the constitutionality of a uniform law adopted in
forty-nine states. There most certainly is a strong presumption of con-
stitutionality. -2 7
This note focuses primarily on the notice provisions the secured party
must comply with before he can either dispose of the collateral by sale
or retain it. It presupposes that the secured party has gained posses-
sion of the collateral upon default by having either had a possessory se-
curity interest," by the debtor having voluntarily given up possession 9
25. Id.
26. The Court was oblivious to the fact that the secured party often has a greater
equity in the collateral than the debtor, and to the fact that part of the basis of the
bargain was that the secured party could look to the collateral when default occurred.
The secured parties in Fuentes were not going after collateral property to which they
had no claim, such as wages or welfare benefits, but were seeking to repossess prop-
erty which they had as much or more of a right to than the debtor. See the dis-
cussion of "collateral property" compared to "wages" and "welfare benefits" in Epps
v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127, 133 (E.D. Pa. 1971), which was vacated in Fuentes.
27. Most states have prejudgment replevin statutes similar to the ones declared
unconstitutional in Fuentes; but when the Court faces a statute which is nearly identi-
cal in forty-nine states and the result of over twenty years of effort, the Justices un-
doubtedly will apply a stronger presumption of constitutionality.
28. UCC § 9-203 recognizes the common law pledge as creating a valid security
interest. Thus the secured party may be in possession of the collateral when default
occurs.
29. A vast number of repossessions result from the debtor merely turning the col-
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or by the secured party having exercised his right to repossession under
section 9-503.
PARTIES To WHOM NOTICE Is NECESSARY
According to section 9-504(3), whether the secured party chooses
to retain the collateral or to dispose of it, he must notify three classes
of parties: (1) the debtor; (2) "any person who has duly filed a
financing statement indexed in the name of the debtor in this state";
and (3) any party who is known by the secured party to have a se-
curity interest in the collateral. 30 For consumer transactions, the rules
are modified to require notice only to the debtor.31
Under existing law, the debtor is not permitted to waive his right
to notice of a sale. 2 The 1972 Official Text, however, proposes to
alter present law and would add to section 9-504(3) a clause per-
mitting the debtor to waive notice of sale once default has occurred. 3
This change may prove unfortunate. It makes the uninformed and un-
suspecting debtor vulnerable to an overreaching creditor; 84 it provides
for waiver, but does not state whether the waiver has to be written or
supported by consideration; 0 and it poses difficult constitutional ques-
lateral over to the secured party. Letter from Richard Beard, Retail Credit Attorney
for the May Department Stores Company, to Washington University Law Quarterly,
September 2, 1972, on file in Washington University Law Library.
30. UCC § 9-504(3).
31. Generally the holder of a security interest in consumer goods will have a
purchase money security interest. Since such an interest has priority in any disti-
bution of the proceeds, there will seldom be excess proceeds. If there is little possi-
bility of excess proceeds, other secured parties would not be motivated to participate
in the sale to ensure that the collateral brings its fair value. See generally 2 GiLMon
§ 292.
32. Existing § 9-501(3) provides the following (emphasis added):
To the extent that they give rights to the debtor and impose duties on the
secured party, the rules stated in the subsections referred to below may not
be waived or varied except as provided with respect to compulsory disposi-
tion of collateral (subsection (1) of Section 9-505) and with respect to re-
demption of collateral (Section 9-506) but ....
33. See note 47 infra, where the change in section 9-504(3) to permit waiver of
notice after default is italicized.
34. In Fuentes, the majority noted that security agreements are often contracts of
adhesion. 92 S. Ct. at 2001-02. After default, when the debtor may feel threatened
and be unusually cooperative with the secured party because of this fear, it seems unwise
on the part of the revisors to place the debtor in a position where he can be the unsus-
pecting victim of a waiver clause.
35. See D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 188 (1972) (waivers of
constitutional rights must be knowingly made, voluntarily entered into, and involve con-
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tions insofar as it may operate to deprive the debtor of a property in-
terest without notice.36
The purpose of notifying those persons specified in 9-504(3) is "to
give the debtor, his representatives, and competing secured parties the
information they need in order to decide whether to redeem the col-
lateral or to bid at the sale."3 It is thought that the greater the num-
ber of parties aware of any sale or retention, the more likely the col-
lateral "will not be sacrificed at less than its true value."38  Since the
Code provides that subordinate secured parties will participate in any
excess of proceeds over those necessary to satisfy the secured party
holding the sale,39 it is felt that subordinate secured parties will be
motivated to ensure a fair value, especially in view of the fact that a
sale or retention discharges subordinate security interests. 40
Secured parties should be cautious when considering the scope of
the term "debtor". Section 9-105(1) defines "debtor" as the "person
who owes payment or other performance of the obligation secured,
whether or not he owns or has rights in the collateral. . . . Where the
debtor and the owner of the collateral are not the same person, the
term 'debtor' means the owner of the collateral. . . ." Section 9-112
specifically sets out the rights of the owner of the collateral to notice.
The comment to this section indicates that the duties of the secured
party to notify "the owner of the collateral are conditioned on the se-
cured party's knowledge of the true state of the facts."''  The secured
party has no duty to discover who may be the actual owner of the col-
lateral.42
"Debtor" has been construed to include parties not ordinarily con-
sidered debtors. For instance, in Third National Bank & Trust Co. v.
sideration). The Code's definition of waiver in section 1-107 would not be applicable
since section 1-107 is concerned with the waiver of a right arising out of a breach of
contract, not a right provided by statute.
36. Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 1995 (1972).
37. 2 GiLMoRE § 544.6, at 1241 (1965).
38. Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963);
Mallicoat v. Volunteer Fin. & Loan Corp., 57 Tenn. App. 106, 415 S.W.2d 347 (1966).
39. UCC § 9-504(1).
40. UCC § 9-504(4):
When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after default, the dispo-
sition transfers to a purchaser for value all of the debtor's rights therein,
discharges the security interest under which it is made and any security inter-
est or lien subordinate thereto.
41. UCC § 9-112, Comment.
42. id.
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Stagnaro,48 the endorser of a note was held to be a debtor within the
meaning of the Code and therefore entitled to notice. When the
maker of the note defaulted by missing payments, the secured party
sold the collateral which secured the note and attempted to collect
from the endorser the deficiency resulting from the sale. The Stagnaro
court refused to hold the endorser liable for the deficiency because of
the secured party's failure to notify the endorser of the sale." The
trustee in bankruptcy will also come within the definition of "debtor"
and must be notified if the sale of the collateral takes place after the
initiation of bankruptcy proceedings." In Norton v. National Bank
of Commerce,46 a car dealer who sold with recourse a conditional sale
contract to a bank, was held to be a debtor for purposes of notice.
When purchaser of the car defaulted, the bank, without notifying the
dealer, sold the car. The court held the bank's sale improper because
the bank failed to notify the car dealer. Any party, therefore, who may
become liable for any portion of the debt or obligation should be
notified.
The 1972 Official Text proposes to eliminate the secured party's ob-
ligation under existing law to notify any secured party who has filed
and any party whom the secured party knows to have a security inter-
est in the goods. In those states that adopt the 1972 Official Text, "the
secured party will only have to notify the debtor and any other secured
party from whom the secured party has received. . . notice of a claim
of an interest in the collateral." 47  The revisors reason that the burden
43. 25 Mass. App. Dec. 58, 4 UCC REP. SERv. 675 (1962).
44. ld. at 66, 4 UCC RP. SEnv. at 677. "We are of the opinion that the defendant,
as endorser, was a debtor at and before time of the sale as the maker had heretofore
dishonored the note." Accord, T. & W. Ice Cream, Inc. v. Carriage Barn, Inc., 107
NJ. Super. 328, 258 A.2d 162 (1969) (secured party proceeding against collateral
securing a corporate note upon default violated notice provisions by not notifying ac-
commodation endorser who came within definition of debtor). But see A. J. Arm-
strong, Inc. v. lanburt Embroidery Corp., 97 N.J. Super. 246, 234 A.2d 737 (1967).
45. In re Frye, Bankruptcy No. 69-1880-D (S.D. Ohio 1970), 9 UCC REP. SERV.
913 (trustee in bankruptcy is entitled to notification of sale of repossessed collateral);
In re Senters, Bankruptcy No. 70-246-D (S.D. Ohio 1970), 9 UCC REP. SRv. 923
(secured party who has taken repossession before bankruptcy and given notice of
sale to bankrupt does not violate notice provisions if date of sale antedates the ap-
pointment of the trustee).
46. 240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966).
47. 1972 OFFcIAL Txr, § 9-504(3), at 252:
. .. [Rleasonable notification of the time and place of any public sale or
reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale or other in-
tended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the
[Vol. 1972:535
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of searching the records is "greater than the circumstances called for
because as a practical matter there would seldom be a junior secured
party who really had an interest needing protection in the case of a
foreclosure sale."'48  The revisors have placed the burden of requesting
notice upon the subordinate secured party. Upon filing, he will recog-
nize the inferior nature of his interest; since he is a second encum-
brancer, he should carry the burden of sending the superior secured
party a written request for notice of any disposal of the collateral. If
he neglects to submit a written request, the harm is not great, since
any excess from the sale goes to the debtor.4 9  If the sale is by a sub-
ordinate secured party, the property passes subject to the senior security
interest. 50
WHEN NOTICE Is EXCUSED
The Code's requirement of reasonable notification is excused in
three situations:5' when the collateral is perishable; 2 when it threatens
to decline speedily in value;5 3 or when it is of a type customarily sold
on a recognized market.54  With perishable collateral and collateral
quickly declining in value, the Code excuses notice to avoid any fur-
ther loss resulting from delay. When the collateral is disposed of on a
recognized market, the market's regularity and stability protect the
debtor's equity in the collateral against prejudice from want of notice.
For many categories of collateral, there is no recognized market. In
holding that there was no such market for used cars, 55 the Norton
debtor, if he has not signed after default a statement renouncing or modify-
ing his right to notification of sale. In the case of consumer goods no other
notification need be sent. In other cases notification shall be sent to any
other secured party from whom the secured party has received (before send-
ing his notification to the debtor or before the debtor's renunciation of his
rights) written notice of a claim of an interest in the collateral.
Changes italicized. See current UCC § 9-504(3), quoted in note 9 supra.
48. Id. at 253-54.
49. UCC § 9-504(2).
50. The Code does not discuss the possibility of a sale under a subordinate se-
curity interest, but Professor Gilmore has written that "Senior liens are not discharged;
the retaining secured party, like a purchaser under § 9-504, would continue to hold
this erstwhile collateral as 'his own' subject to the senior liens," 2 GILMORE, § 1225.
51. Although the Code does not require notice in these three situations, the se-
cured party, to avoid difficulties at trial, should dispatch regular notice.
52. UCC § 9-504(3).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143, 146, 398 S.W.2d 538,
A . CLE 9
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court described a recognized market as "a stock market or a commod-
ity market, where sales involve many items so similar that individual
differences are nonexistent or immaterial, where haggling and com-
petitive bidding are not primary factors in each sale and where the
prices paid in actual sales of comparable property are currently avail-
able by quotation." 56
REASONABLE NOTIFICATION
Compliance with the Code's mandate of "reasonable notification"
will depend on whether the secured party has decided to hold a public
sale, a private sale, or proposes to retain the collateral in satisfaction
of the debt.
Private Sale or Other Disposition
Section 9-504(3) demands that "reasonable notification of the time
after which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made
shall be sent by the secured party . . . ." The word "sent" has led
some courts into mistakenly thinking that notice must be written. 7
Section 1-201(3), however, says that the requirement of "send" in
connection with any notice is satisfied if the party "has notice within
the time at which it would have arrived if properly sent. . . ." Sec-
tion 1-201(28) states that "A person 'receives' a notice or notification
when it comes to his attention. .. ." Oral notice, thus, is sufficient,
but a secured party would be well-advised to give written notice in
order to avoid evidentiary problems in litigation.5 s
540 (1966) ("What one 1957 Oldsmobile sells for does not fix the amount a different
one may be expected to bring."); Alliance Discount Corp. v. Shaw, 195 Pa. Super.
601, 604, 171 A.2d 548, 550 (1961):
The so-called "red-book" purporting to fix prices of various makes and models
of automobiles in accordance with their year of manufacture is adopted for
the convenience and benefit of dealers and is not based on market prices
which are arrived at in the open, based on asking prices of sellers and
bids of prospective buyers.
But see Third Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Stagnaro, 25 Mass. App. Dec. 58, 4 UCC RP.
SERv. 675 (1962) (considered International Tractor and Trailmobile tandem box as
property sold on recognized market).
56. 240 Ark. at 146, 398 S.W.2d at 540 (1966).
57. See, e.g., Foundation Discounts, Inc. v. Serna, 81 N.M. 474, 476, 468 P.2d
875, 877 (1970): "Defendant may have had verbal notice that there would be a sale
of the collateral. However, this does not satisfy the requirements of the Code."
58. Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Alatzas, 10 UCC REP. Snxv. 482 (Md. Ct. App.
1972).
[Vol. 1972:535
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Reasonable notification only necessitates that the secured party take
such steps as "may be reasonably required to inform the other in the
ordinary course whether or not such other actually comes to know of
it."59  Though the Code does not require that the other party actually
receive notice (except in retention cases),"" there are situations where
reasonable notification requires the secured party to do more than dis-
patch notice. In Mallicoat v. Volunteer Finance & Loan Corpora-
tion,6' the secured party sent notice by registered mail to the debtor.
Before the actual sale, the letter was returned to the secured party un-
claimed. The court held that the secured party, who was aware that
the debtor had not received actual notice, failed to comply with the
Code and was acting in conscious disregard of the debtor's right to
notice. Since the Mallicoat decision dealt with a secured party who
knew the debtor and who was in a position to phone him easily, courts
in situations where the secured party can not contact the debtor easily
might find that the dispatch of a registered letter is sufficient, even
though it is returned unclaimed before the sale. It is also clear that a
secured party who sends a registered letter to a previous address of the
debtor from which he knows the letter will not be forwarded,62 or who
fails to provide adequate postage on the letter,63 does not give reason-
able notification."4
Though the question of what type of mailing is reasonable is a factual
issue, 5 courts have approved the sending of registered,60 certified, 7
59. UCC § 1-201(26).
60. See notes 86-88 infra and accompanying text.
61. 57 Tenn. App. 106, 415 S.W.2d 347 (1966).
62. See Atlas Constr. Co. v. Dravo-Doyle Co., 114 Pitt. Legal J. 34, 3 UCC REP.
SERV. 124 (Pa. C. P. 1965).
63. W. E. Edmondson v. Air Serv. Co., 123 Ga. App. 263, 180 S.E.2d 589 (1971).
64. In cases where the party to be notified is missing, notice dispatched to the
person's last known address would suffice. However, the secured party cannot under
the Code's requirement of reasonableness send notice to the last known address if he
knows the party can not be reached there and he has made no other effort to reach
him.
65. Leasing Associates, Inc. v. Slaughter & Sons, Inc. 450 F.2d 174 (8th Cir.
1971); cf. Hawkins v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 250 Md. 146, 242 A.2d 120
(1968).
66. Atlas Const. Co. v. Dravo-Doyle Co., 114 Pitt. Legal J. 34, 3 UCC REP. Snav.
124 (Pa. C. P. 1965); Mallicoat v. Volunteer Fin. & Loan Corp., 57 Tenn. App. 106,
415 S.W.2d 347 (1966).
67. Hudspeth Motors, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 238 Ark. 410, 382 S.W.2d 191 (1964);
Motor Contract Co. of Atlanta v. Sawyer, 123 Ga. App. 207, 180 S.E.2d 282 (1971);
Steelman v. Associates Discount Corp., 121 Ga. App. 649, 175 S.E.2d 62 (1970).
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and regular letters."8 Courts recommend registered mail, but it is
doubtful whether the registered letter is as effective as regular mail for
consumer transactions. If the addressee of a registered letter is not at
home to take delivery, the postman will return it to the post office
where it will remain for about ten days and then, if not picked up, be
returned to the sender as unclaimed. A regular mailing would be
left at the debtor's address and would not require the addressee to
make a trip to the post office. From a registered mailing, the secured
party will learn when a letter is unclaimed, but such knowledge is of
little value to the debtor, for by the time the secured party has this in-
formation the sale will usually have taken place. Courts, interested in
suggesting what is reasonable notification, should recommend that the
secured party send two letters: one by registered mail and the other by
regular.
Determining whether a particular sale is public or private will affect
the content of the notice. Article 9 does not define either, but section
9-504(1) states that, "Any sale of goods is subject to the Articles on
Sales." Thus, for a sale of goods, and by analogy for sales of other
items, the definitions in the comment to section 2-706 are informa-
tive: "By 'public' is meant a sale by auction. A 'private' sale may be
effected by solicitation or negotiation."
Notice of a private sale must specify "the time after which"I" the
sale will be made. Notices in which the secured parties have merely
informed the parties to whom notice is necessary that there would be a
private sale, without stating the time after which they would hold the
sale, have been considered inadequate.70 Professor Gilmore believes
that, "[A]t a minimum, a commercially reasonable notice of a private
sale also should describe the collateral and state the amount of the
obligation for which it is being sold."'71
After the secured party dispatches notice, he must delay holding the
sale until the other parties have had sufficient opportunity to protect
their interests. The length of the waiting period is a factual ques-
68. Leasing Associates, Inc. v. Slaughter & Sons, Inc., 450 F.2d 174 (8th Cir.
1971).
69. UCC § 9-504(3).
70. Morris Plan Co. of Bettendorf v. Johnson, 271 N.E.2d 404 (IM. App. 1971).
The debtor knew of sale, but the court held that the Code requires more than a general
advertisement or a reasonable expectation on part of the debtor if the notice require-
ments for a private sale are to be met.
71. 2 GMmoaE § 44.6, at 1241.
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tion.7 2 Waiting periods of seven, 3 eight,74 and ten7 days have been
approved. Accordingly, it is probably safe to assume that ten days is
sufficient time for the notified parties to take steps to protect their in-
terests.76 If the secured party knew the debtor was out of town for
ten days, good faith would, of course, require a longer delay.
To be confident of complying with the Code's dictate of reasonable
notification of a private sale, the secured party should send a written
notice by either registered mail or regular mail, preferably both, at
least ten days prior to the sale. The notice should describe the col-
lateral, state the date after which the sale will be held, list the amount
of the obligation for which the sale is being held and give the address
where the secured party can be reached.
Public Sale
There are two distinct types of notice required for public sales: the
notice which must be sent to the parties listed in section 9-504(3) and
the advertisement notice necessary to make a public sale commercially
reasonable. The advertisement notice, although not expressly mandated
by the Code, is implied from the common law concept of a public sale
as one to which "notice or invitation to the public is an essential ele-
ment."'7 7  Newspaper publication of a sale may be sufficient advertise-
ment notice to inform the public, but it certainly would not be adequate
notice to the debtor and other parties, as required by section 9-504(3).
When the secured party is notifying the debtor and other secured
parties, the notice must state the "time and place of any public sale."
Additional requirements, such as the necessity of a "writing", descrip-
tion of the collateral, etc. are the same as were discussed in relation to
notice of a private sale.78 The more difficult notice problem in regard
to a public sale centers on the advertisement notice; namely, what type
72. Babe v. Williams Ford Co., 239 Ark. 1054, 396 S.W.2d 302 (1965).
73. Id.
74. Atlas Const. Co. v. Dravo-Doyle Co., 114 Pitt. Legal J. 34, UCC REP. Smv.
124 (Pa. C. P. 1965).
75. Motor Contract Co. of Atlanta v. Sawyer, 123 Ga. App. 207, 180 S.E.2d 282
(1971).
76. UNInom ConIrriONAL SALEs ACT § 19 (required ten-day notice); UNImVo
TRUST RECEIPT ACT § 6 (required five-day notice).
77. Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 575 (1949).
78. See notes 57-69 supra and accompanying text.
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of advertisement notice is sufficient to satisfy the Code's requirement
that "every aspect '79 of a public sale be commercially reasonable.
As noted earlier, article 9 does not define public sale. Section 9-504
(4), which discusses the rights of purchasers at a public sale, suggests
by its use of the phrase "other bidders" that a public sale is an auction
sale. When the collateral is goods, the comment to section 2-706,
which discusses public sales, provides little assistance for determining
what constitutes a commercially reasonable advertisement notice. Sec-
tion 2-706(4)(c) does, however, add the specific requirement that
"notification of sale must state the place where the goods are located
and provide for their reasonable inspection by prospective bidders" if
the goods are not to be within view of those attending the sale.
Cases decided under section 9-504(3) have taken for granted that
a public sale is an auction sale, but only three cases have considered
what is a commercially reasonable advertisement notice.80 Two cases
approved of advertisements in newspapers. 81 A third case, while sug-
gesting that advertisement notice might consist of the secured party tele-
phoning several persons he thought would be interested in the sale, also
implied that posting a notice in a conspicuous place might be ade-
quate.8 2  Comment 9 to section 2-706 suggests that advertisement
notice is necessary only when the public sale is not held at "a place or
market which prospective bidders may reasonably be expected to at-
tend."
A California amendment8 3 to section 9-504(3) specifies that the ad-
79. UCC § 9-504(3).
80. Goodin v. Farmers Tractor & Equip. Co., 249 Ark. 30, 458 S.W.2d 419
(1970); Foundation Discounts, Inc. v. Serna, 81 N.M. 474, 468 P.2d 875 (1970);
Massey-Ferguson Fin. Corp. v. Hamlin, 9 UCC REP. SRv. 142 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1971).
81. Goodin v. Farmers Tractor & Equip. Co., 249 Ark. 30, 458 S.W.2d 419
(1970) (public sale where six separate newspaper ads failed to produce any bidders,
held to be reasonable notification); Massey-Ferguson Fin. Corp. v. Hamlin, 9 UCO
REP. SErv. 142 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1971) (court states minimum requirements for com-
mercially reasonable newspaper notice).
82. Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Ferris, 9 UCC REP. SERV. 555 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971).
83. CAL. COMM. CODE § 9-504(3) (West 1964):
Notice of the time and place of a public sale shall also be given at least five
days before the date of sale by publication once in a newspaper of general
circulation published in the county in which the sale is to be held. Any
public sale shall be held in the county or place specified in the security
agreement, or if no county or place is specified in the security agreement,
in the county in which the collateral or any part thereof is located or in
the county in which the debtor has his residence or chief place of busi-
ness, or in the county in which the secured party has his residence or
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vertisement notice of a public sale must be by newspaper publication,
but the Permanent Editorial Board of the Code has criticized the
amendment as "unsound public policy" and destructive of the Code's
"desirable flexibility. '8 4
Presently, no easy formula can be devised to test whether an ad-
vertisement notice satisfies the requirements of section 9-505(3).
Courts will scrutinize each factual situation to determine whether the
secured party took adequate steps to make the sale sufficiently public
so that a commercially reasonable price could be expected. 5
Retention of the Collateral in Satisfaction of the Debt
Section 9-505(2) allows the secured party in possession, except in
certain consumer transactions, 86 to propose a retention of the collateral.
The secured party must send notice of his proposal to retain to the
same parties to whom notice of sale is necessary under section 9-504
(3).87  For retention, the Code demands written notice and actual re-
ceipt of notice. A requirement of actual receipt is implicit within the
clause which allows the secured party to retain only if the debtor or
other party does not object to the retention "in writing thirty days from
the receipt of notification." Thus, the debtor must actually receive
a place of business if the debtor does not have a residence or chief place of
business within this State. If the collateral is located outside this State or
has been removed from this State, a public sale may be held in the locality
in which the collateral is located. Any public sale may be postponed from
time to time by public announcement at the time and place first noticed for
the sale or by public announcement at the time and place to which the sale
may have been postponed . . . . Any sale of which notice is delivered or
mailed and published as herein provided and which is held as herein pro-
vided is a public sale.
84. REPORT No. 2 OF THE PERMANENT EDrrORIAL BOARD OF THE UCC, at 294
(1964).
85. Compare the Code's requirements with Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 19
which required that the secured party holding a public sale "give notice of sale by at
least three notices posted in different places within the filing district in which the goods
are to be sold, at least five days before the sale. If at the time of retaking, $500 or
more has been paid on the purchase price, the seller shall also give notice of the sale
at least five days before the sale by publication in a newspaper published or having a
general circulation within the filing district where the goods are to be sold." (Emphasis
added.)
86. When the debtor has paid sixty percent of the price of any consumer goods,
the secured party must hold a sale under section 9-504(3). If such a sale is not held
within ninety days from taking possession, then the secured party is liable in con-
version and damages. UCC § 9-505(1).
87. See notes 31-50 supra and accompanying text.
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notice before the thirty day period can begin to run. Actual receipt
is made mandatory in this situation since the secured party who retains
the collateral is also allowed to keep any payments which the debtor
has made.
Section 9-505(2) specifies only that the notice of a proposal to retain
state that it is such a proposal. But the notice, if it is to be useful and
commercially reasonable, should also describe the collateral and state
the amount of the unpaid obligation so that the notified parties will
have sufficient information to decide whether to object to the reten-
tion."" It is submitted that fairness to the debtor might also require
the secured party to inform him of the amount of the payments already
made and that they will be forfeited.
CONSEQUENCES OF NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE PROVISIONS
When a secured party has failed to properly observe the notification
requirements, three issues arise: the effect of noncompliance on the
debtor's and other parties' right to redeem; the amount and nature of
damages recoverable from the secured party; and whether the secured
party has a right to a deficiency judgment.
Before sale or other disposition under section 9-504(3) or before
discharge of the obligation by rentention under section 9-505 (2), the
debtor or any other secured party may redeem.8 9 When the collateral
reaches the hands of a purchaser for value without knowledge of de-
fect in the disposition,9" the right to redemption is lost regardless
of whether the secured party has complied with the notice require-
ments. Presumably in other situations the right to redeem would
continue. For instance, a secured party who purchased at his own
public sale would not cut off the right to redemption,9 nor would
a secured party who proposed to retain the collateral in satisfaction
of the debt defeat the right to redemption if he failed to observe the
notice requirements.9 2
88. 2 GIudROa § 44.3.
89. UCC § 9-506:
... the debtor or any other secured party may unless otherwise agreed in
writing after default redeem the collateral by tendering fulfillment of all obli-
gations secured by the collateral...
90. UCC § 9-504(4).
91. 2 Gi.moRE § 44.9.2.
92. But in the sole case discussing the right to redemption when the secured party
chose to retain the collateral and had not complied with notice provisions, the court
550 [Vol. 1972:535
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Initially, the burden is on the debtor or other party to establish
that the secured party has not given proper notice. Section 9-507(1)
then provides that the debtor, any person entitled to notice, or any per-
son whose security interest was made known to the secured party prior
to disposition has "a right to recover from the secured party any loss
caused by a failure to comply with the provisions of this Part." The
measure of loss usually applied is the difference between the actual
selling price of the collateral and the amount which could reasonably
have been obtained through a sale conducted according to law. 9
Once it is established that the secured party violated the Code's pro-
visions, the value of the collateral is presumed to be the amount of the
debt with the burden upon the secured party to rebut this presump-
tion.94
The Code does not provide for punitive damages except when con-
sumer goods are involved. In consumer cases section 9-507(1) pro-
vides for a minimum recovery; when the actual damages are less than
the minimum statutory damage recovery, the excess would function as
a penalty.95
The doctrine of strict foreclosure was the rule at common law; the
secured party who sold the collateral was limited to the proceeds of the
sale, 90 and he could not sue the debtor for any remaining deficiency.
gave the debtor only the option of allowing the secured party to keep the collateral in
satisfaction of the debt or of ordering the secured party to sell the collateral pursuant
to section 9-504(3). Brownstein v. Fiberonics Indus., Inc., 110 N.J. Super. 43, 264
A.2d 262 (1970).
93. Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87 (Alas. 1969) (difference between
selling price and market price); Barker v. Horn, 245 Ark. 315, 432 S.W.2d 21 (1962);
Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382, 276 A.2d 402 (1971) (difference
between selling price and fair and reasonable value); T & W Ice Cream, Inc., v. Car-
riage Barn, Inc., 107 N.J. Super. 328, 258 A.2d 162 (1969) (difference between what
the collateral was sold for and what it would have been sold for had the debtor been
given notice).
94. Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87 (Alas. 1969); Norton v. National
Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 131, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966).
95. UCC § 9-507(1):
If the collateral is consumer goods, the debtor has a right to recover in any
event an amount not less than the credit service charge plus ten per cent of
the principal amount of the debt or the time price differential plus ten per-
cent of the cash price.
96. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089,
323 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1971); C.I.T. Corp. v. Haynes, 161 Me. 359, 212 S.2d 436 (1965);
Shuchman, Profit on Default: Archival Study of Automobile Repossession and Resale,
22 STAN. L. Rav. 20, 54 (1969). Professor Shuchman takes the position that dealers
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The Uniform Conditional Sales Act97 changed this rule. The secured
party was allowed to sue for a deficiency judgment, but the deficiency
judgment was allowed only if the secured party had strictly complied
with the statutory notice requirements when selling the collateral.
Section 9-504(2) states that "unless otherwise agreed, the debtor is
liable for any deficiency."9 8 The Code, however, is silent on whether
compliance with the notice provisions is a condition precedent to a de-
ficiency action.99 The cases are in conflict, with a slight majority deny-
ing the secured party a deficiency action for his failure to observe the
notice provisions.100 Under this rule, the secured party who has held an
improperly executed sale will be liable in damages to the debtor for
any loss caused by the sale and will also be denied his right to a de-
ficiency decree. In jurisdictions which permit the deficiency action,
the secured party usually can offset his deficiency judgment against
any damages including the minimum statutory damage recovery pro-
vided in consumer cases by section 9-505 (1).101
CONCLUSION
The amount of litigation involving the notice provisions of article 9
indicate that their apparent simplicity and minimal red tape are a trap
should be limited to the collateral (strict foreclosure) with no right to a deficiency
judgment. He contends that "were automobile repossessors to use the efficient busi-
ness practices in resale that they do in dealings with one another, there would be no
need for anything except the security of the automobile itself."
97. See 2 Gxu.toR § 4.9.4, at 1262 (discusses provisions of the Uniform Con-
ditional Sales Act).
98. UCC § 9-504(2):
If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party must ac-
count to the debtor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise agreed, the debtor
is liable for any deficiency.
99. Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963).
100. Id.; Braswell v. American Nat'l Bank, 117 Ga. App. 699, 161 S.E.2d 420
(1968); Morris Plan Co. v. Johnson, 271 N.E.2d 404 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971); C.I.T. Corp.
v. Haynes, 161 Me. 359, 212 A.2d 436 (1965); One Twenty Credit Union v. Darcy,
40 Mass. App. Dec. 64, 5 UCC REP. SERv. 792 (1968); Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Ferris,
9 UCC REP. SERv. 555 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971); Foundation Discounts, Inc. v. Sema, 81
N.M. 474, 451 P.2d 995 (1971); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt
Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 323 N.Y.S.2d 13 (N.Y. County Civil Ct. 1971). Contra, Leas-
ing Associates, Inc. v. Slaughter & Sons, Inc., 450 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1971); Weaver v.
O'Meara Motor Co. 452 P.2d 87 (Alas. 1969); Norton v. National Bank of Commerce,
240 Ark. 131, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966); T & W Ice Cream, Inc. v. Carriage Barn, Inc.,
107 N.J. Super. 328, 258 A.2d 162 (1969).
101. Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 NJ. Super. 382, 276 A.2d 402 (1971);
Crosby v. Basin Motor Co., 9 UCC REP. SERV. 555 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971).
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for the unwary and a continual source of difficulty; but the 1972
Official Text, except for reducing the number of parties to whom
notice is nezessary upon default and a provision for waiver of notice of
sale after default, has left part 5 of article 9 intact. It is unfortunate
for the cause of uniformity that the revisors did not take a position, at
least by way of comment, on some of the recurring problems which
require clarification, such as the purpose and operation of the concept
of "recognized market" as an exception to notice; the requirements for
a commercially reasonable advertisement notice of public sale; and the
effect of noncompliance with the notice provisions on the secured
party's right to a deficiency action.
These problems will not be moot even if the Fuentes decision were
eventually to result in a ruling that the Code's self-help remedies were
unconstitutional for failure to provide the debtor with an opportunity
to be heard before repossession and sale. Security agreements may,
as the Fuentes dissent noted, include constitutionally valid waiver pro-
visions in which debtors knowingly, willingly, and for consideration
waive their right to notice and a hearing. Other situations, such as
when the secured party has a possessory security interest or when the
debtor has voluntarily returned the collateral, would not come within
the Fuentes mandate. Thus, the basic problem-how best to adjust the
equities when default occurs-remains vital. 102
102. If the Fuentes mandate of notice and a hearing were applied to the remedies
provided in article 9, it would not eliminate them, but merely postpone their operation.
The result of the debtor's hearing will in most cases be that the secured party has a
right to dispose of the collateral pursuant to one of the Code's remedies.
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